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Abstract. Motivated by the need to have secure blind signatures even in
the presence of quantum computers, we present two efficient blind signa-
ture schemes based on hard worst-case lattice problems. Both schemes
are provably secure in the random oracle model and unconditionally
blind. The first scheme is based on preimage samplable functions that
were introduced at STOC 2008 by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan.
The scheme is stateful and runs in 3 moves. The second scheme builds
upon the PKC 2008 identification scheme of Lyubashevsky. It is state-
less, has 4 moves, and its security is based on the hardness of worst-case
problems in ideal lattices.
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1 Introduction
Since 1982, when Chaum proposed his idea of blind signatures [10], it has become
an important primitive for anonymous Internet banking, e-voting applications
(e.g. [36,22]), as well as for multi-party computation such as oblivious transfer
[12]. These applications will retain their importance in both, near and far future.
As for the near future, we are convinced that current factoring and discrete
logarithm based instantiations are efficient and secure. But for how long?
Today, when building provably secure cryptographic schemes, one has to
keep emerging technologies and especially quantum computers in mind. In the
quantum-age, the cryptographic assumptions change with the leap in computing
power that quantum computers will provide.
There are only a few cryptographic assumptions that are conjectured to be
post-quantum, i.e. they are considered to withstand quantum computer attacks.
One of those assumptions is the hardness of finding short vectors in a lattice.
There is also a benefit of building cryptography upon hard lattice problems today
because, unlike factoring or computing discrete logarithms, they have withstood
even subexponential attacks and the best known algorithm [3] is exponential in
the lattice dimension. Furthermore, lattice problems typically allow a worst-case
to average-case reduction that goes back to Ajtai [2]. It states that a randomly
chosen instance of a certain lattice problem is at least as hard as the worst-case
instance of a related lattice problem. The reduction was later on adapted to
work with ideal lattices by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [26].
According to the security model, mainly influenced by Juels, Luby, and Os-
trovsky [20] as well as Pointcheval and Stern [34], blind signature schemes have
to satisfy blindness and one-more unforgeability. Blindness states that the signer
must not obtain any information on the signed messages and one-more unforge-
ability enforces that an adversarial user cannot obtain more signatures than
there were interactions with the signer.
1.1 Our contribution
We construct two lattice-based blind signatures. One is based on preimage sam-
plable functions that were introduced by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan
(GPV) [18] along with a digital signature scheme. The scheme is stateful, un-
conditionally blind, one-more unforgeable if a certain interactive assumption
(similar to the one-more trapdoor inversion assumption in [7] for RSA) holds,
and has three moves. The scheme is presented using general (not ideal) lattices
but recently Stehle´, Seinfeld, Tanaka, and Xagawa [14] showed how to improve
the GPV signature scheme using ideal lattices. Their modifications are directly
applicable to our blind signature scheme and significantly reduce the public-key
size.
Our second construction is far stronger. It is built upon Lyubashevsky’s
identification and signature scheme [28,27]. It is also unconditionally blind and
one-more unforgeable if standard lattice problems in ideal lattices are hard in
the worst-case. With its four rounds it is still very efficient, i.e., all operations
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have quasi-linear complexity and all keys and signatures require a quasi-linear
amount of bits. In both schemes, we establish blindness via an abstraction of the
filtering technique from [27].
We believe that our work is an important contribution and that we solve
a longstanding problem because the previous efficient constructions, like [10],
[33], [34], [1], [7], [11], [24], [31], have one thing in common: they are built upon
classic number theoretic assumptions, like the hardness of factoring large integers
or computing discrete logarithms. The newer approaches of Boldyreva [8] and
Okamoto [31] tend to use pairings and bilinear maps that yield very elegant
constructions. They, however, are again based on the discrete logarithm problem
in this specific setting. None of the above schemes withstands subexponential
attacks or remains secure in the presence of reasonably large quantum computers,
where both factoring and computing discrete logarithms become easy due to the
seminal work of Shor [38].
Finally, we would like to mention that there are also (typically inefficient)
instantiations from general assumptions, e.g. by Juels, Luby, and Ostrovsky [20],
Fischlin [15], and Hazay, Katz, Koo, and Lindell [19]. Whether they are post-
quantum, largely depends on the exact realization of primitives.
1.2 Organization
After a preliminaries section with a brief introduction to lattice theory and the
relevant security models, we present our constructions in Sections 3 and 4. The
instantiation in Section 3 is based on a trapdoor function in lattices, whereas
the one in Section 4 is based on an identification scheme in ideal lattices. With
this preliminary version, we want to convey the construction principles of our
blind signature schemes. The proofs, a security analysis, as well as proposed
parameters will appear in a later full version. The talk given at Dagstuhl showed
a different method for obtaining blind signatures. It uses blinding values chosen
from a Gaußian distribution, which makes the resulting schemes only statistically
blind in an asymptotic sense. However, the benefit of this alternative distribution
would be that the schemes are, at least asymptotically, complete in a single run
and there is no need to deal with aborts.
2 Preliminaries
With n, we always denote the security parameter. (a, b)← 〈A(x),B(y)〉 denotes
the joint execution of two algorithms A and B in an interactive protocol with
private inputs x to A and y to B. The private outputs are a for A and b for B.
〈A(x),B(y)〉k means that the interaction can take place up to k times.
x
$← X means that x is chosen uniformly at random from the finite set X.
Recall that the statistical distance of two random variables X,Y over a domain
D is defined as ∆(X,Y ) = 1/2
∑
a∈D |Prob[X = a]−Prob[Y = a] |. A function
is negligible in n if it vanishes faster than 1/p(n) for any polynomial p(n).
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In the following, we recall the definitions of blind signatures and commit-
ments. Afterwards, we briefly recall the forking lemma and some necessary facts
from lattice theory.
2.1 Blind signatures
A blind signature scheme BS consists of three algorithms (Kg,Sign,Vf), where
Sign is an interactive protocol between a signer S and a user U . The specification
is as follows.
Key generation. Kg(1n) outputs a private signing key sk and a public verifi-
cation key pk.
Signature issse. Sign(sk,M) describes the joint execution of S and U . The
private output of S is a view V and the private output of U is a signature s
on the message M ∈M under sk. Thus, we write (V, s)← 〈S(sk),U(pk,M)〉.
Signature verification. The algorithm Vf(pk, s,M) outputs 1 if s is a valid
signature on M under pk and otherwise 0.
Completeness is defined as with digital signature schemes, i.e., every honestly
created signature for honestly created keys and for any messages M ∈ M has
to be valid under this key. Views are interpreted as random variables, whose
output is generated by subsequent executions of the respective protocol. Two
views V1 and V2 are considered equal if they cannot be distinguished by any
computationally unbounded algorithm with noticeable probability.
As for security, blind signatures have to satisfy two properties: blindness and
one-more unforgeability [20,34]. The notion of blindness is defined in the follow-
ing experiment ExpblindS∗,BS, where the adversarial signer S∗ chooses two messages
M0,M1 and interacts with two users who obtain blind signatures for the two
messages in random order. Note that the executions of the two users may be
arbitrarily interleaved. After seeing the unblinded signatures in the original or-
der, with respect to M0,M1, the signer has to guess the message that has been
signed for the first user. If either of the user algorithms fails in outputting a
valid signature, the signer is merely notified of the failure and does not get any
signature. In particular, he does not see which user algorithm aborted.
Experiment ExpblindS∗,BS(n)
b
$← {0, 1}
(pk, sk)← BS.Kg(1n)
(M0,M1, statefind)← S∗(find, sk, pk)
(d, stateissue)← S∗〈·,U(pk,Mb)〉
1,〈·,U(pk,M1−b)〉1(issue, statefind)
Let sb and s1−b be the outputs of U(pk,Mb) and U(pk,M1−b), respectively.
If s0 6= fail and s1 6= fail
d← S∗(guess, s0, s1, stateissue)
Else
d← S∗(guess, fail, fail, stateissue)
Return 1 iff d = b
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A signature scheme BS is (t, δ)-blind, if there is no adversary S∗, running in time
at most t, that wins the above experiment with advantage at least δ, where the
advantage is defined as
AdvblindS∗,BS =
∣∣∣∣Prob[ExpblindS∗,BS(n) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The second security property, one-more unforgeability, ensures that each com-
pleted interaction between signer and user yields at most one signature. It is
formalized in the following experiment ExpomfU∗,BS, where an adversarial user tries
to output  valid signatures after ` <  completed interactions with an honest
signer.
Experiment ExpomfU∗,BS(n)
H
$← H(1n)
(pk, sk)← BS.Kg(1n)
{(M1, s1), . . . , (M, s)} ← U∗H(·),〈S(sk),·〉(pk)
Let ` be the number of (complete) interaction between U∗ and the signer.
Return 1 iff
1. Mi 6= Mj for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ;
2. BS.Vf(pk, si,Mi) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , ;
3. ` < .
A signature scheme BS is (t, qSign, qH, δ)-one-more unforgeable if there is no ad-
versary A, running in time at most t, making at most qSign signature queries and
at most qH hash oracle queries, that wins the above experiment with probability
at least δ.
2.2 Commitments
Commitments typically work in two phases. First, one party publishes a commit-
ment C = com(M ; r) to a message M without revealing any information about
it. This is the “hiding” property of the commitment scheme. In the second phase,
the party can prove that C actually corresponds to M by revealing r. It is im-
portant that no algorithm can find a second message M ′ and randomness r′
such that C = com(M ′; r′) — the “binding” property. A scheme is (t, δ)-hiding
(-binding) if there is no algorithm running in time at most t that can break the
hiding (binding) property with probability at least δ.
Both properties can be satisfied computationally or unconditionally but there
is no scheme that is unconditionally hinding and unconditionally binding [17].
For our schemes, we want blindness to be as strong as possible, which is why we
assume the existence of a unconditionally hiding and computationally binding
commitment scheme that is (t, δcom)-binding for any polynomial t in n.
As we are interested in fully lattice-based schemes, we would like to point
out that commitment schemes can be built upon on hard lattice problems [23].
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2.3 Forking Lemma
The generalized forking lemma of Bellare and Neven [6] is an important tool for
proving security in the random oracle model. It provides a lower bound for the
probability that a randomized algorithm outputs two related values when run
twice with the same random tape but with a different random oracle. We use it
in Section 4 to prove one-more unforgeability.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 in [6]). Fix an integer q ≥ 1 and a set H of size h ≥ 2.
Let A be a randomized algorithm that on input x, h1, . . . , hq returns a pair, the
first element of which is an integer in the range 0, . . . , q and the second element
of which we refer to as a side output. Let IG be a randomized algorithm that we
call the input generator. The accepting probability of A, denoted acc, is defined
as the probability that J ≥ 1 in the experiment
x
$← IG;h1, . . . , hq $← H; (J, σ) $← A(x, h1, . . . , hq) .
The forking algorithm FA associated to A is the randomized algorithm that takes
input x proceeds as follows:
Algorithm FA(x)
Pick coins ρ for A at random
h1, . . . , hq
$← H
(I, σ)← A(x, h1, . . . , hq; ρ)
If I = 0 then return (0, , )
h′I , . . . , h
′
q
$← H
(I ′, σ′)← A(x, h1, . . . , hI−1, h′I , . . . , h′q; ρ)
If I = I ′ and hI 6= h′I′ then return (1, σ, σ′)
Else return (0, , ).
Let
frk = Prob
[
b = 1 : x $← IG; (b, σ, σ′)FA(x)
]
.
Then
frk ≥ acc
(
acc
q
− 1
h
)
.
2.4 Lattices
A lattice in Rn is a set Λ = {∑di=1 xi bi |xi ∈ Z}, where b1, . . . ,bd are linearly
independent over R. The matrix B = [b1, . . . ,bd] is a basis of the lattice Λ and
we write Λ = Λ(B). The number of linearly independent vectors in the basis is
the dimension of the lattice. Now, consider modular lattices as a special form
of lattices. Given a modulus q, a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , and the equation A v ≡ 0
(mod q), then the set of all vectors v ∈ Zmq that satisfy the above equation is a
lattice. Lattices of this form are denoted with Λ⊥q (A).
The main computational problem in lattices is the (approximate) shortest
vector problem (SVP), where an algorithm is given a description, a basis, of a
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lattice Λ and is supposed to find the shortest vector v ∈ Λ \ {0} with respect to
a certain `p norm (up to an approximation factor). More precisely, find a vector
v ∈ Λ \ {0}, such that ‖v‖p ≤ γ ‖w‖p for all w ∈ Λ \ {0} for a fixed approx-
imation factor γ ≥ 1. This problem is known to be NP-hard for all `p norms
[13,37,21] with a constant approximation factor. For exponential (in the lattice
dimension) approximation factors, the problem is solvable in polynomial time
by the famous LLL algorithm by Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lova´sz [25]. For polyno-
mial approximation factors, which are relevant for cryptography, the best known
algorithm is exponential (space and time) [3]. We refer the interested reader to
a recent survey [35] by Regev for the currently known “approximability” and
“inapproximability” results. The practical hardness of these lattice problems is
analyzed in [16,4].
In the special case of modular lattices, there is also a special version of the
SVP, named short integer solution problem (SIS). There, an algorithm is given
a basis of Λ⊥q (A) and is supposed to output a non-zero solution v ∈ Zmq to the
above equation. The algorithm succeeds if ‖v‖p ≤ ν for a given norm bound ν.
The SIS was, in principle, introduced by Ajtai [2] and its hardness is analyzed in
[29] and [18]. The latter work also explicitly deals with the `∞ norm, which we
will use in our security proofs. We write SISp(m, q, ν) for the SIS problem in m-
dimensional lattices Λ⊥q (A) with norm bound ν w.r.t. the `p norm. The problem
is (t, δ)-hard if no algorithm that runs in time t can solve it with probability at
least δ. Similarly, the inhomogeneous version (find a short v with Av ≡ y, for a
given y 6= 0) is denoted with ISISp(m, q, ν).
Yet another special class of lattices are ideal lattices. In particular, consider
lattices corresponding to ideals in the ring R = Zq[X]/〈Xn + 1〉. We identify
f ∈ R with its coefficient vector f = (f0, . . . , fn−1) ∈ Znq . Furthermore, we
denote elements of the R-module Rm with aˆ = (a0, . . . ,am−1) or directly with
(a0, . . . , amn−1) ∈ Zmnq . Consequently, we define ‖f‖∞ = ‖(f0, . . . , fn−1)‖∞. A
lattice corresponds to an ideal I if and only if every lattice vector is the coefficient
vector of a polynomial in I. The above problems SIS and ISIS easily translate to
ideal lattices.
Both, ideal SIS and SIS are considered as average-case problems, which are
directly related to uniformly random chosen problem instances in lattice cryp-
tography. By a worst-case to average-case reduction [2,26] they are provably at
least as hard as all instances of ideal SVP (ISVP) resp. SVP in a certain smaller
dimension.
3 Blind signatures from preimage samplable functions
In this section, we describe our blind signature scheme and prove its security
in terms of blindness and one-more unforgeability. It is based on the signature
scheme by Gentry et al. [18] and we describe it in terms of general lattices.
However, following the ideas of [14], there is also a version using ideal lattices,
which has a significantly shorter public keys.
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The roadmap for this section is as follows: We describe the 3-round blind sig-
nature scheme BS = (Kg,Sign,Vf) after briefly recalling the concept of preimage
samplable functions as they will be needed in our construction. Then, we prove
unconditional blindness and one-more unforgeability based on an interactive as-
sumption that is related to a certain lattice prolem but not equivalent.
The underlying family of preimage samplable trapdoor functions is a triple
(TrapGen,SampleDom,SamplePre), with the following specification.
Trapdoor generation. TrapGen(1n) outputs (a, t), where a fully defines the
function fa : Dn 7→ Rn and the trapdoor t is used to sample from the inverse
f−1t : Rn 7→ D?n, which is implemented as SamplePre(t, ·). Let m = 5n log(q),
q = Ω(n3), and D = ω(m log(m)). The function domain is Dn = {x ∈ Zm :
‖x‖∞ ≤ xmD−D}, x ∈ N>0, and the range is Rn = Znq . SamplePre samples
preimages from a subset D?n = {x ∈ Zm : ‖x‖∞ ≤ D} of Dn.
Evaluation. The function fa(x) outputs Ax mod q, where A ∈ Zn×mq is part
of the public key a.
Domain sampling with uniform output. SampleDom(n) draws samples from
some distribution over D?n, such that their images under fa are uniformly
distributed over Rn(cf. [18]).
Preimage sampling. Let y ∈ Rn. f−1t (y) samples x ← SampleDom(n) under
the condition that fa(x) = y. There are at least ω(log(n)) such preimages
for every image y.
One-wayness. Computing an inverse of the function fa : Dn 7→ Rn is infeasible
without the trapdoor t as long as ISIS∞(m, q, xmD −D) is hard.
Collision resistance. Finding a collision (x,x′) ∈ D2n under fa is infeasible
unless SIS∞(m, q, 2xmD − 2D) is easy.
Note that we slightly modified the original setting regarding the sets Dn, D?n.
In [18], it is always the same, whereas we have introduced different Dn, D?n
for trapdoor evaluation and preimage sampling, respectively. As in the original
work, we will always assume that the above properties, especially the statistical
distributions, hold for fa in a perfect sense. Using a proposition from [18], we
can establish the following corollary for our choice of parameters:
Corollary 1. Let n,m, q,D, x as above. If there is a polynomial time (in n)
algorithm that breaks SIS with ν (or ISIS with ν) with non-negligible probability
then there is another polynomial time algorithm that solves SIVP (a variant of
SVP) with approximation factors γ ≥ νO˜(√n) in all lattices of dimension n.
In addition to the above trapdoor function, we need a full-domain hash function
(cf. [9]) H ← H(1n), where H : {0, 1}∗ → Rn and H is a family of collision
resistant hash functions. We assume that there is no polynomial time algorithm
that finds collisions but with negligible probability δH.
Our blind signature scheme BS = (Kg,Sign,Vf) is defined as follows.
Key generation. BS.Kg(1n) outputs (a, t)← TrapGen(1n), where a is the pub-
lic verification key and t is the secret signing key, and sets up a list of already
signed messages LM = {0} ⊆ Rn.
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Signer S(t) User U(a,M)
r
$← {0, 1}n
β
$← Dβ
C ← com(M ; r)
µ←−−−−−−−−−−− µ← H(C) + fa(β)
If µ ∈ LM
Set σ ← fail
Else
Compute σ ← f−1t (µ)
LM ← LM ∪ {µ}
σ−−−−−−−−−−−→ If σ 6∈ D?n
Abort with s← fail
s← s− β
If s 6∈ Dn
result = (C, β)
Else
result←−−−−−−−−−−− result← ok
If result 6= ok
Parse result = (C, β)
If µ = H(C) + fa(β)
If fa(σ − β) = H(C)
and σ − β 6∈ Dn and β ∈ Dβ
Trigger restart
Output V ← (µ, σ) or (µ, β, C, σ) Output (M, (r, s))
Fig. 1. Issue protocol of the blind signature scheme BS.
Signature protocol. Let Dβ = {x ∈ Zm : ‖x‖∞ ≤ xmD}. The signature issue
protocol for messages M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is shown in Figure 1. The user employs a
commitment scheme com : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ that is unconditionally
hiding and computationally binding (but with probability δcom). Note that
the blind signature scheme is stateful, i.e. the signer does not sign a blinded
message µ twice and it does not sign µ = 0 ∈ Rn in particular1. The result
is s ∈ Dn.
Verification. BS.Vf(a, (r, s),M) outputs 1 iff s ∈ Dn and fa(s) = H(com(M ; r)).
Completeness. The scheme BS is complete with constant probability e−1/x be-
cause for all honestly generated key pairs (a, t), all messages M ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
1 Signing 0 would result in a short vector in Λ⊥q (A) and help learn the private signing
key similar to the method in [30]. Due to the linearity of fa, the same applies if a
message is signed twice.
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all signatures (r, s), we have s = σ− β and fa(s) = fa(σ− β) = fa(σ)− fa(β) =
fa(f−1t (H(com(M ; r)) + fa(β)))− fa(β) = H(com(M ; r)). Assuming σ ∈ Dn, we
also have BS.Vf(a, s,M) = 1. This happens with constant probability as shown
in the following probabilistic lemma with k = n,A = D,B = xmD.
Lemma 2. Let k ∈ N and a,b ∈ Zk with
a ∈ {v ∈ Zk : ‖v‖∞ ≤ A}
b $← {v ∈ Zk : ‖v‖∞ ≤ B}
and B ≥ xkA for x ∈ N>0. Then
Prob
b
[‖a− b‖∞ ≤ B −A] >
1
e1/x
− o(1).
Setting x ≥ 2, we expect the protocol to be complete in a single run. If the
protocol fails, the user simply reveals the current interaction (com(M ; r), β, σ)
to the signer in order to prove that the execution failed. If the commitment
scheme is perfectly hiding, the user does not reveal any information about M .
Then, the protocol is repeated with fresh values for r and β. Observe that this
does not affect the upcoming security analysis because the individual protocol
runs are indepedent. In particular, the hiding property of com can be directly
used in the blindness proof and the binding property is used in the proof of
unforgeability.
Blindness. We prove that BS is unconditionally blind, i.e. (∞, 0)-blind, if com is
unconditionally hiding. If it is only statistically or computationally hiding, the
blind signature scheme is also statistically resp. computationally hiding. The
intuition is that the signer only sees random elements from Rn after the user
has applied a random blinding value. The output signature is again randomized
by a sufficiently large value β, which hides the internal ordinary signature.
Theorem 1 (Blindness). The blind signature scheme BS is (∞, 0)-blind.
One-more unforgeability. We prove that our blind signature scheme is unforge-
able under a special assumption, namely that the following “one-more trapdoor
inversion problem” is hard.
Definition 1 (Chosen target trapdoor inversion problem (CTTI)). The
chosen target trapdoor inversion problem is defined via the following experiment
ExpcttiA , where the adversary A has access to a challenge oracle ORn and to an
inversion oracle f−1t . The adversary wins, if it outputs  preimages for challenges
obtained from ORn , while making only ı <  queries to f
−1
t . The oracle f
−1
t does
not answer queries twice and its does not invert 0 ∈ Rn and it returns preimages
in D?n.
Experiment ExpcttiA (n)
(a, t)← TrapGen(1n)
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(pi,x1, . . . ,x)← AORn ,f−1t (·)(n, a)
Note: f−1t does not answer to 0 or already queried values.
Let y1, . . . ,y` be the challenges returned by ORn .
Let ı be the number of queries to f−1t .
Return 1 iff
1. The xi are pairwise distinct and
2. ‖xi‖∞ ≤ xmD +D and fa(xi) = ypi(i) for all i = 1, . . . ,  and
3. ı < .
The problem is (t, qI, qO, δ)-hard if there is no algorithm A, running in time
at most t, making at most qI inversion queries, and at most qO queries to ORn ,
which wins the above experiment with probability at least δ. The one-wayness of
fa gives us (poly(n), 0, 1, δ)-hardness, which we will extend to (poly(n), poly(n),
poly(n), δ′)-hardness for a negligible δ′. With our definition and this assumption,
we follow the line of thought of Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval, and Semanko
in [7]. They define a collection of “one-more” problems in the RSA context,
which are perfectly tailored for proving one-more unforgeability. In [5], Bresson,
Monnerat, and Vergnaud give a separation result on these “one-more” problems,
showing that they cannot be proven equivalent to “simple” RSA inversion. The
same seems to apply here. There is also a recent work on so-called adaptive
one-way functions by Pandey, Pass, and Vaikuntanathan [32], which discusses
similar assumptions.
In the following, we will assume (poly(n), poly(n), poly(n), δ)-hardness of CTTI
on the grounds that it is directly related to the provably hard problem of forg-
ing GPV signatures. In both cases, one has to find a solution x ∈ Dn to the
equation fa(x) = y for a given y, while knowing polynomially many distinct
preimage-image pairs.
Theorem 2 (One-more unforgeability). Let TSig and TH be the cost func-
tions for simulating the oracles Sig and H, respectively. The BS blind signature
scheme is (t, qSign, qH, δ)-one-more unforgeable if the CTTI is (t, qSig, qH, δ− δH−
δcom)-hard.
4 Blind signatures from ideal lattices
In this section, we construct a second lattice-based blind signature scheme. Here,
the construction is not built upon a trapdoor, which allows us to fully simulate
the scheme in our security proofs and give very strong arguments for one-more
unforgeability. The underlying signature scheme is due to Lyubashevsky [28].
Both, Lyubashevsky’s signature scheme and our blind signature scheme are se-
cure in the random oracle model under a worst-case assumption in ideal lattices
and their time and space complexity is only O˜(n).
The roadmap for this section is as follows: We describe the 4-round blind
signature scheme BS = (Kg,Sign,Vf). Then, we prove unconditional blindness
and one-more unforgeability based on the assumptions that solving ISVP in
dimension n is hard in the worst case.
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For the setup, we need the global parameters in Table 1, where R = Zp[X]/
〈Xn+1〉. The scheme relies on the lattice-based collision resistant hash function
Parameter Value
m log(n)
p (prime) ≥ 4n2m log2(n)(x3n3m2 − x2n2m2 − 2x2n2m+ 2xnm+ xn) = Θ(n5 log5(n))
Ds, D {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1}
Dα {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤ xn} for a constant x ∈ N>0
D∗ {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤ xn− 1}
Dy {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤
√
n log(n)(x2n2m− xnm)}
Dβ {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤
√
n log(n)(x3n3m2 − x2n2m2 − x2n2m+ xnm)}
G∗ {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤
√
n log(n)(x2n2m− xnm− xn+ 1)}
G {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤
√
n log(n)(x3n3m2 − x2n2m2 − 2x2n2m+ 2xnm+ xn− 1)}
D {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤
√
n log(n)(x3n3m2 − x2n2m2 − xn+ 1)}
Table 1. Parameters for the security parameter n.
family H(R, D,m) by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [26]. We fix a random h $←
H(R, D,m), mapping Dm 7→ R, D ⊂ R. Note that the function is linear over
Rm, i.e., h(a(xˆ + yˆ) = a(h(xˆ) + h(yˆ)) for all a ∈ R, xˆ, yˆ ∈ Rm. In addition,
finding a collision (x, x′) ∈ D2 under h, i.e. solving Col(h,D) or alternatively
ideal SIS∞ with ν = |D|1/n−1, implies being able to solve ISVP∞ in every lattice
that corresponds to an ideal in R. More formally, from [28], we know:
Theorem 3 (Theorem 3.1 in [28]). Let D = {f ∈ R : ‖f‖∞ ≤ d}, m >
log(p)/ log(2d), and p ≥ 4dmn√n log(n). An adversary C that solves the Col(h,D)
problem, i.e., finds two preimages xˆ, yˆ ∈ Dm such that h(xˆ) = h(yˆ), can be used
to solve ISVP∞ with an approximation factor of γ ≥ 16dmn log2(n) in every
lattice that corresponds to an ideal in Z[X]/〈f〉.
Furthermore, we need a random oracle H $← H(1n) mapping {0, 1}∗ 7→ D.
Again, there is no polynomial time algorithm that finds collisions but with neg-
ligible probability δH.
Key generation. BS.Kg(1n) selects a secret key sˆ $← Dms and computes the
public key S← h(sˆ). The output is (sˆ,S).
Signature protocol. The signature issue protocol for messages M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is
depicted in Figure 2. Note that values controlled by the user are written as
Greek letter and those controlled by the signer are in Latin. In the first step,
the user employs a commitment scheme com : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗
that we assume to be unconditionally hiding and computationally binding
(but with probability δcom).
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Signer S(sˆ) User U(S,M)
yˆ
$← Dmy Y−−−−−−−−−−−→ r $← {0, 1}n
Y ← h(yˆ) C ← com(M ; r)
α
$← Dα
βˆ
$← Dmβ
← H(Y − Sα− h(βˆ), C)
∗ ← − α
If ∗ 6∈ D∗
Start over with fresh α
∗←−−−−−−−−−−−
zˆ∗ ← sˆ∗ + yˆ
If zˆ∗ 6∈ Gm∗
Trigger restart
zˆ∗−−−−−−−−−−−→ zˆ← zˆ∗ − βˆ
If zˆ 6∈ Gm
result← (C,α, βˆ, )
Else
result← ok
result←−−−−−−−−−−−
If result 6= ok
Parse result = (C,α, βˆ, )
If ∗ + α =  = H(Y − Sα− h(βˆ), C)
and H(h(zˆ∗ − βˆ)− Sα,C) = 
and zˆ∗ − β 6∈ Gm
Trigger restart
Output V ← (Y, ∗, zˆ∗) Output (M, (r, zˆ, ))
Fig. 2. Issue protocol of the blind signature scheme BS.
Whenever the signer triggers a restart, the user chooses a fresh r in order
to make the protocol execution independent of the previous one. Therefore,
we omit values from previous runs in the signer’s view. The signer can also
detect a cheating user that tries to trigger a restart although it has received
a valid signature. In this case, the signer can stop the protocol and assume
that the user has obtained a valid signature.
Eventually, the user outputs (r, zˆ, ).
Verification. BS.Vf(a, (r, zˆ, ),M) outputs 1 iff zˆ ∈ Gm and H(h(zˆ) − S,
com(M ; r)) = .
Completeness. Assuming that the protocol does not abort, then for all honestly
generated key pairs (sˆ,S), all messages M ∈ {0, 1}∗, and all signatures (r, zˆ, )
we have zˆ ∈ Gm and h(zˆ)− S = h(zˆ∗ − βˆ)− S = h(sˆ(− α) + yˆ − βˆ)− S =
Y− Sα− h(βˆ) and com(M ; r) = C. Therefore H(h(zˆ)− S, com(M ; r)) =  and
BS.Vf(s, (r, zˆ, ),M) = 1.
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Potentially, the protocol has to be restarted a couple of times at three stages.
First, the user may have to “start over with a fresh α”, which is not noticed by
the signer. Applying Lemma 2 on − α ∈ D∗ (k = n,A = 1, B = xn) yields a
constant probability for this event.
Second, the signer may abort in case zˆ∗ 6∈ Gm∗ in order to hide its secret
key. The probability for not aborting here is again constant by Lemma 2 (k =
mn,A =
√
n log(n)(xn − 1), B = √n log(n)(x2n2m − xnm)) because ‖sˆ∗‖∞ ≤√
n log(n)(xn−1) but with negligible probability for randomly chosen ∗ by [28,
Lemma 2.11].
Third, the user might abort if zˆ 6∈ Gm. Again, Lemma 2 with k = mn,A =√
n log(n)(x2n2m − xnm − xn + 1), and B = √n log(n)(x3n3m2 − x2n2m2 −
x2n2m+ xnm) provides that it will not abort with constant probability.
Thus, we only need a logarithmic (in n) number of trials to pass each of these
aborts. In practice, 2 trials are sufficient for each of them and by choosing x ≥ 3
we expect the protocol to be complete in a single run.
Observe that all operations in BS have O˜(n) complexity and that private
keys, public keys, and signatures have size O˜(n).
Blindness. We prove that our scheme is (∞, 0)-blind based on the observation
that the signer only sees values that are statistically independent of the message
being signed. More precisely, the views generated by two different messages are
indistinguishable.
Theorem 4 (Blindness). The blind signature scheme BS is (∞, 0)-blind.
One-more unforgeability. BS is one-more unforgeable if there is at least one ideal
lattice, corresponding to an ideal in R, within which the ISVP∞ is hard. We
will use the forking lemma [34,6] to obtain a solution to the collision problem
Col(h,D), which can be used to find short lattice vectors in the worst case
via Theorem 3. Col(h,D) is (t, δ)-hard if no t-time adversary can solve it with
probability at least δ. For our proof, it is crucial that the blind signature scheme
is witness-indistinguishable with respect to the private key sˆ, i.e., there are at
least two distinct sˆ, sˆ′ ∈ Ds with h(sˆ) = h(sˆ′) such that no efficient algorithm
can distinguish whether sˆ or sˆ′ was used by the signer with probability more
than 1/2 + 2−ω(log(n)). We then use the forking lemma and “hope” that the
adversary in the one-more unforgeability experiment outputs a signature that
corresponds to a private key sˆ′, while we use sˆ in the simulation. Our scheme
is witness-indistinguishable because it yields valid signatures for the witness-
indistinguishable signature scheme in [28].
Theorem 5 (One-more unforgeability). Let TSig and TH be the cost func-
tions for simulating the oracles Sig and H, respectively, and let c < 1 be the con-
stant probability with which one protocol run has to be aborted. BS is (t, qSign, qH, δ)-
one-more unforgeable if Col(h,D) is (t′, δ′)-hard with t′ = t + qSigTSig + qHTH
and non-negligible δ′ if and only if δ is non-negligible.
By Theorem 3, we get the following, strong security guarantees.
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Corollary 2. BS is one-more unforgeable if solving ISVP∞ is hard in the worst
case for approximation factors γ ≥ 16mn√n log2(n)(x3n3m2−x2n2m2−2x2n2m+
2xnm+ xn) = O˜(n4√n) in lattices that correspond to ideals in R.
Comparing Corollary 2 with Corollary 1 may lead to the conclusion that the
scheme in Section 3 has stronger security guarantees. This, however, is not the
case because it is not provably as hard to break as finding collisions under the
employed trapdoor function. Corollary 1 is a mere indication of hardness while
Corollary 2 is an actual reduction from worst-case lattice problems.
5 Conclusions
We have shown how to construct efficient and provably secure blind signature
schemes based on worst-case lattice problems. Our first construction is compa-
rable to RSA blind signatures, which also rely on an interactive assumption.
However, our second construction is provably secure without such assumptions
and directly relies on the hardness of standard lattice problems, which are conjec-
tured to be intractable even by quantum computers and subexponential attacks.
All in all, our second scheme is the preferred scheme for practical purposes as it
is more efficient and has stronger security guarantees.
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